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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Anthony Robert Bonilla pled guilty
to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of
a firearm, and was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, and a
concurrent unified term of five years, with two years fixed. In this appeal, he contends
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officer’s act
of lifting up his T-shirt to search for weapons during the course of a routine traffic stop
was not a permissible pat down under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and thus
exceeded the scope of his consent. The district court should have suppressed the
baggie of marijuana discovered in Mr. Bonilla’s pocket, along with the additional
evidence discovered in the search of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle and the statements he made
to the police.

Mr. Bonilla also contends the district court abused its discretion at

sentencing and failed to take proper account of the mitigating factors that exist in this
case.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 18, 2015, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Will Reimers, a police officer with
the Boise Police Department, stopped a Chevrolet Blazer on the on-ramp of Interstate
84 after observing the vehicle travel approximately 40 miles per hour in a 35 mile per
hour zone and change lanes without signaling for a sufficient period of time.
(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.169, 172; 6/17/15 Tr., p.2, Ls.13-16, p.3,
L.18 – p.4, L.4; 10/8/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.15-24.) Officer Reimers testified at the preliminary
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hearing that this was a random traffic stop.1 (6/17/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-6.) When Officer
Reimers approached the vehicle, he observed tools and loose stereo equipment in the
backseat. (6/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-15; 10/18/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.) Officer Reimers
learned from dispatch that the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, Mr. Bonilla, had
previously been arrested for burglary in Elmore County. (6/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-23.)
Officer Reimers testified that this information “peaked [his] interest” and he was
“suspicious there might be something related to vehicle burglaries or residential
burglaries” in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle. (6/17/15 Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.4.)
At this point, another vehicle—a white Honda—pulled up and parked in front of
Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle. (6/17/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-18.) Officer Reimers called for backup
and within a few minutes, two other officers arrived on scene—Shane Williams and
Brian Jones.2 (6/17/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-14, p.24, Ls.14-21; 10/8/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.8-11.)
Officer Williams approached the Honda and spoke to the female driver of the Honda.
(6/17/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-14.) Officer Williams asked the driver what she was doing there,
and she replied she did not know. (6/17/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17, p.22, Ls.17-22.) Officer
Williams asked her to leave and she left. (6/17/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17, p.22, Ls.17-22.)
Officer Reimers testified at the preliminary hearing that he wanted to search
Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle because of what he had observed in the vehicle. He testified,
“Well, again, based on his previous—or the record I learned about through dispatch of
the burglary, I wanted to get him out of the vehicle, ask—I asked Officer Jones to issue

Officer Reimers’ police report is consistent with his testimony at the preliminary
hearing in describing his initial response/contact with Mr. Bonilla as resulting from an
observed traffic violation. (PSI, p.169.)
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a citation for the traffic violation, so I could get a closer look at things in the vehicle.”
(6/17/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-13.)

Officer Reimers asked Mr. Bonilla to exit the vehicle.

Mr. Bonilla asked why, and Officer Reimers replied, “[B]ecause I said so.” (10/8/15
Tr., p.38, L.18 – p.39, L.2.)

Mr. Bonilla complied and exited the vehicle.

(6/17/15

Tr., p.8, Ls.14-16.)
As Mr. Bonilla was exiting the vehicle, Officer Reimers observed a D-cell Maglite
“between the space where the driver’s seat is and the door frame.” (6/17/15 Tr., p.8,
Ls.19-24.) Officer Reimers asked Mr. Bonilla “if he had any other weapons on his
person.” (6/17/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.22-24.) Officer Reimers then asked Mr. Bonilla if he could
pat him down for weapons and Mr. Bonilla consented. Officer Reimers testified at the
suppression hearing, “I asked him if I could check his person and he said, yes, you can
pat me—or pat me down.” (10/8/15 Tr., p.33, Ls.9-11.)
Officer Reimers did not pat Mr. Bonilla down, but instead lifted his T-shirt, and
observed a plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance sticking out of the right
pocket of Mr. Bonilla’s pants. (6/17/15 Tr., p.9, L.18 – p.10, L.1; 10/8/15 Tr., p.33, L.12
– p.34, L.23.) Officer Reimers asked Mr. Bonilla if this was marijuana and Mr. Bonilla
said it was marijuana. (10/8/15 Tr., p.34, Ls.20-23.) Officer Reimers placed Mr. Bonilla
under arrest, deployed his drug dog, and searched Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle, ultimately
discovering several baggies of methamphetamine, a digital scale, several pills, and a
shotgun. (6/17/15 Tr., p.10, L.4 – p.11, L.14, p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.3, p.23, L.2 – p.24,
L.3.)

Officer Reimers testified at the suppression hearing that he may have called for
backup earlier simply because the traffic stop was on the interstate. (10/8/15 Tr., p.42,
Ls.7-14.)
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Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Bonilla was charged by Amended
Information

with

the

following:

(1)

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver; (2) possession of a controlled substance
(hydrocodone); (3) unlawful possession of a firearm; (4) possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana); (5) possession of a controlled substance (temazepam); (6)
possession of a legend drug (quetiapine); and (7) possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.20-21, 26-28.)
Mr. Bonilla filed a motion to suppress arguing Officer Reimers did not have a
reasonable basis for conducting a pat down of Mr. Bonilla, and did not have a
reasonable basis for expanding the scope of the pat down by lifting Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt.
(R., pp.39-50.) The district court denied the motion following a hearing. (R., pp.80-81,
100-09.) The district court concluded that Mr. Bonilla consented to the pat down, and
that Officer Reimers did not exceed the scope of Mr. Bonilla’s consent when he lifted up
Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt. (R., pp.107-08.) The district court stated:
The Court agrees that in general, the search of [Mr. Bonilla’s] pockets
when there was no reason to suspect there was a weapon in them would
have gone beyond the scope of the consent, and have been
impermissible. But this is not a plain feel case—it is plain view at that
point because [Mr. Bonilla] had a baggie of marijuana sticking out of his
pocket.
(R., p.108.) The district court did not consider whether the information discovered in
Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle after he was placed under arrest would have inevitably been
discovered.
Following the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Bonilla entered
into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a
4

firearm in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. (R., p.110.) Mr. Bonilla
reserved his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.111, 115,
120; Mot. to Augment, Ex. A, p.12, Ls.9-20.3)
The district court accepted Mr. Bonilla’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a
unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, for possession with intent to deliver, and
a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm, to
be served concurrently.

(R., pp.111, 123.)

The judgment was entered on

December 14, 2015. (R., pp.122-25.) Mr. Bonilla filed a timely notice of appeal on
December 14, 2015.4 (R., pp.130-32.)

Simultaneously with the filing of this Brief, Mr. Bonilla is filing a Motion to Augment to
include in the Clerk’s Record copies of the Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing held
on October 22, 2015 and the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence,
dated March 7, 2016.
4 On December 14, 2015, Mr. Bonilla filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(“Rule 35”) for reconsideration of sentence. (R., p.133.) The district court denied
Mr. Bonilla’s Rule 35 motion on March 7, 2016. (See Mot. to Augment, Ex. B.)
Mr. Bonilla does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion in light of
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
3
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Bonilla to a
unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, for possession with intent to
deliver, and to five years, with two years fixed, for unlawful possession of a
firearm, to be served concurrently?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bonilla’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches. “A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660 (2007) (citation omitted). “One
such exception allows an officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of
a detainee in order to remove any weapons.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

“A warrantless search may also be permissible when

conducted pursuant to an individual’s consent.” State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626
(Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
Mr. Bonilla does not contest that he consented to a limited pat down search of his
person to check for weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (stating a police officer may
conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of [a] person[ ] in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him”). However, Officer Reimers did
not conduct a carefully limited search of Mr. Bonilla’s outer clothing in an attempt to
discover a weapon. Instead, he simply lifted up Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt, which led to the
discovery of a baggie of marijuana in Mr. Bonilla’s pocket. Officer Reimers’ search
exceeded the scope of Mr. Bonilla’s consent and violated Mr. Bonilla’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment. The district court erred in denying Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress
and its order must be reversed.
7

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157
Idaho 416, 418 (2014). However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

Because Mr. Bonilla Consented To A Terry Pat Down And The Lifting Of His TShirt Was Not A Permissible Terry Pat Down, It Exceeded The Scope Of
Mr. Bonilla’s Consent And Thus Violated His Rights Under The Fourth
Amendment
“It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent, the State must

conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent.”
Tyler, 153 Idaho at 626 (citations omitted). “The standard for measuring the scope of
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, or in other
words what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect.” (citations omitted). “The scope of a search is generally defined
by its expressed object.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citation omitted);
see also State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004).
Here, Mr. Bonilla consented to a Terry pat-down to check for weapons. In his
police report, Officer Reimers wrote, “I asked [Mr. Bonilla] if he had any other weapons
on his person. He told me he did not have any other weapons. I asked him if I could
check his person. He told me, ‘yes, you can pat me down.’” (PSI, pp.169-70.) Officer
Reimers testified at the suppression hearing, “I asked [Mr. Bonilla] if I could check his
person and he said, yes, you can pat me—or pat me down.” (10/18/15 Tr., p.33, Ls.9-
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11.) Officer Reimers referred to the search as a “terry-pat.” Officer Weir testified at the
suppression hearing, “As I got on scene, Officer Reimers explained to me, as he was
conducting his terry-pat, that there was a Baggie of marijuana in the suspect’s pocket.”
(10/8/15 Tr., p.19, Ls.8-12.) There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Bonilla consented
to a search that was more intrusive than a Terry pat down.
The lifting of Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt was not a permissible Terry pat down.

In

State v. Watson, the Idaho Court of Appeals held “the permissible scope of a pat-down
search for weapons is limited to the minimum intrusion necessary to reasonably assure
the officer that the suspect does not have a weapon.” 143 Idaho 840, 845 (Ct. App.
2007). The Watson Court explained “[a] protective frisk is designed to allow the officer
to conduct his investigation without fear of violence and must be strictly limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons.” Id. at 844 (citations omitted).

An

officer can further invade a person’s privacy after feeling a bulge under a person’s
clothing only “[i]f the officer is unable to make an objectively reasonable determination
that [the object] is not a weapon . . . .” Id. at 845.
Officer Reimers did not conduct a pat down of Mr. Bonilla—he did not feel the
outside of Mr. Bonilla’s clothing to determine whether he might have a weapon on his
person. Instead, Officer Reimers simply lifted up Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt so that he could
observe the waistline of his pants.

The following exchange took place at the

suppression hearing between the prosecutor and Officer Reimers:
Q.

And so based on your concerns about weapons and his consent,
did you pat him down?

A.

I did. Yes, sir.

Q.

And tell us about the process that you used.
9

A.

He was wearing a shirt that was—fell below his waistline, I would
say, probably, down to his pockets, right in there.

Q.

Could you stand for us and then—

A.

Sure.

Q.

--approximate?

A.

Yeah; so I would say, probably, six inches, five or six inches below
his belt line.

Q.

Thank you.

A.

Yes. So, initially, I lifted his shirt to check his belt, his waistline.
That’s the most common place that people keep weapons, knives,
guns, things like that.

(10/8/15 Tr., p.33, L.12 – p.34, L.3.) Officer Reimers later explained, “I felt that I needed
to lift the shirt before I put my hands where I couldn’t see and to confirm there’s no
weapons there.” (10/8/15 Tr., p.46, Ls.11-14.) It is beyond dispute that Officer Reimers
did not conduct a pat down, but simply lifted Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt.
Relying largely on United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), the district court concluded that the lifting of Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt “would be
reasonable without consent and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that it was
beyond the scope of [Mr. Bonilla’s] consent.”

(R., pp.107-08.)

The district court’s

reliance on Hill is misplaced. In Hill, a police officer encountered the defendant close to
the scene of an armed bank robbery within a short time of its commission. 545 F.2d at
1193. The officer testified that “while conversing with the [defendant] he noticed a large
bulge at [the defendant]’s waistband which he suspected of being caused by a weapon.”
Id. at 1192.

The officer raised the defendant’s shirt, “exposing his waistband and

revealing four to six rolls of currency.” Id. at 1192–93. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
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the lifting of the defendant’s shirt was permissible under Terry because “the officer’s
investigation was wholly confined to the area of the bulge in question and was a direct
and specific inquiry.” Id. at 1193.
Here, Officer Reimers did not observe a bulge under Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt; nor
was the lifting of Mr. Bonilla’s shirt a direct and specific inquiry.
distinguishes this case from Hill.

That alone

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has made clear

subsequent to Hill that lifting a suspect’s shirt exceeds the constitutional scope of Terry
“unless the officer previously identified (and testified to) what he suspected to be a
weapon or contraband.” United States v. Ortiz, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1093 (N.D. Cal.
2014). In United States v. I.E.V., the Ninth Circuit held that a police officer exceeded
the scope of a permissible Terry pat down where he lifted the defendant’s shirt after
feeling a brick-shaped object during a frisk, but did not testify that he believed the object
he felt was a weapon. 705 F.3d 430, 440 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit cautioned in
I.E.V. that a pat down cannot be a search for a “needle in a haystack.” Id. In Ortiz, the
federal district court for the Northern District of California held that a police officer
“exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry Frisk by lifting [the defendant’s] shirt” and
specifically rejected the officer’s argument that it was appropriate to lift the defendant’s
T-shirt because it was “baggy.” 54 F.Supp.3d at 1092-93.
The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Officer Reimers’ act
of lifting Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt was a permissible Terry pat down. It is clear from the case
law cited above that Officer Reimers’ act of lifting Mr. Bonilla’s T-shirt was not
authorized by Terry, and thus exceeded the scope of Mr. Bonilla’s consent.
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D.

All The Evidence Discovered In Mr. Bonilla’s Vehicle And The Incriminating
Statements Made By Mr. Bonilla Subsequent To the Discovery Of The Marijuana
Must Be Suppressed
All the evidence discovered in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle and the incriminating

statements made by Mr. Bonilla subsequent to the discovery of marijuana in his pocket
resulted from the discovery of that marijuana and cannot be purged of the primary taint
of the wrongfulness of that search. As a result, the evidence and statements must be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963); see also State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 (1984). The prosecutor
argued at the suppression hearing that “assuming for the sake of argument, the terrypat was not legally done, all the other stuff, the dog sniff, the subsequent search, the
subsequent Mirandizing and statements by Mr. Bonilla, are all independent of that.”
(10/8/15 Tr., p.48, Ls.8-12.) The prosecutor argued the dog sniff was “an independent
source for the evidence in this case with the exception of the marijuana in Mr. Bonilla’s
pocket.” (10/8/15 Tr., p.48, Ls.13-18.) The district court did not reach this argument,
but it is legally flawed for two reasons, and must be rejected.
First, as counsel for Mr. Bonilla pointed out at the suppression hearing, Officer
Reimers did not have reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation prior to the
discovery of the marijuana in Mr. Bonilla’s pocket. Counsel argued, “at that point in time
[prior to the discovery of the marijuana], there was no indication that there were
necessarily drugs in the vehicle. Mr. Bonilla didn’t appear to be under the influence of
anything. There were no drugs seen in plain sight . . . .” (10/8/15 Tr., p.51, L.13 – p.52,
L.5.) Officer Reimers could have conducted a dog sniff of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle even
absent reasonable suspicion, but the dog sniff could not have prolonged or added time
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to the stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015);
see also State v. Linze, No. 42321, 2016 WL 90669, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2016).
Authority for the seizure of Mr. Bonilla would have ended when the tasks tied to the
traffic infraction were, or reasonably should have been, completed. See Rodriguez, 135
S.Ct. at 1616, Linze, 2016 WL 90669, at *3. It is the State’s burden to demonstrate that
a seizure was sufficiently limited in scope and duration, and the State did not meet its
burden in this case.
Second, a dog sniff inside a vehicle constitutes a search that must be supported
by probable cause when the dog’s entry inside the vehicle is facilitated by law
enforcement. See United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214 (10th Cir. 2010). Here, as discussed above, Officer
Reimers did not have reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, to search for
drugs in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle. And the entry of Officer Reimers’ dog into Mr. Bonilla’s
vehicle was clearly facilitated by law enforcement.

Officer Reimers testified at the

preliminary hearing that, after he placed Mr. Bonilla under arrest, he walked his dog
around Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle with the door still open, and the dog “jumped into the
vehicle” and placed his nose on a bag behind the center console in the backseat.
(6/17/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-18.) The dog did not alert until he was inside the vehicle.
Officer Reimers facilitated the dog’s search inside Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle, which is
impermissible. See, e.g., United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding dog sniff in vehicle’s interior was impermissible where, absent
reasonable suspicion, the officers opened the vehicle’s door and unleashed the dog
near the open door).
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Because the dog sniff could not serve as an independent source for the evidence
found and statements made subsequent to the discovery of marijuana in Mr. Bonilla’s
pocket, the evidence and statements made must be suppressed.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Bonilla To A Unified
Term Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Possession With Intent To Deliver, And
To Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm, To Be
Served Concurrently
Mr. Bonilla asserts that, given any view of the facts, the sentences he received
are excessive.

Where, as here, a sentence imposed by the district court is within

statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse
of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the
most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119
Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).

“A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to

accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When
reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an independent
examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler,
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentences the district court imposed upon Mr. Bonilla were not reasonable
considering the nature of his offenses, his character, and the protection of the public
interest. Possession with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm are
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certainly serious crimes. But Mr. Bonilla was stopped in a traffic stop that was not so
serious, and he did not pose a danger to anyone at any time during his encounter with
the police. Moreover, the firearm he possessed was a 1950 single-shot bolt action
shotgun which “was strictly a bird hunting gun.” (Mot. to Augment, Ex. A, p.24, L.21 –
p.25, L.11.) Mr. Bonilla is deserving of some punishment, but not to the extent of the
sentences imposed by the district court.
The sentences were also not reasonable considering Mr. Bonilla’s character.
Mr. Bonilla was 32 years old at the time of sentencing. (PSI, p.1.) He was addicted to
methamphetamine and marijuana at the time he committed the instant offenses, but had
benefitted from the time he spent in jail prior to his sentencing. As he explained to the
presentence investigator, “After being incarcerated and being sober for the last 6
months I have had the opportunity to have [an] eye opener in realizing my drug problem
and use.” (PSI, p.23.) He begged the court to “give [him] the chance and opportunity to
become a better man, better father and a productive member to society.” (PSI, p.24.)
He expressed deep affection for his two young children and a desire to be there for
them in a meaningful way. (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Bonilla’s own childhood was fraught with
challenges. He is a self-described “crack baby” who was exposed to drugs and alcohol
at a young age, and was placed in a group home at the age of nine or ten. (PSI, p.15.)
Mr. Bonilla apologized at sentencing to the court, his community and his family.
(12/10/15 Tr., p.63, Ls.18-20.) And he explained that he knew he could be successful if
given the chance:
I am a hard-working, motivated husband and a father of a two-and-a-half
year old daughter and my one-and-a-half-year-old son. I got involved into
drugs resulting in losing control of myself and allowed my drug addiction to
get the best of me. I became self-centered and was not thinking clearly. I
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was not able to see all of the problems I was causing, not just to my family
but in my life all around. I have lost almost everything in my life. I know
that I still have my recovery and a long life of sobriety ahead of me and the
possibility of getting my kids back.
(12/10/15 Tr., p.63, L.23 – p.64, L.13.) All of these factors should have resulted in
lesser sentences.
The sentences imposed by the district court were also not necessary to protect
the public interest.
incarceration.

Mr. Bonilla was an inmate worker during his presentence

(PSI, p.27, 12/10/15 Tr., p.62, Ls.4-5.) His counsel informed the district

court at sentencing that Mr. Bonilla had four potential job opportunities waiting for him
upon release. (12/10/15 Tr., p.61, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Bonilla had also been accepted into
two substance abuse programs. (PSI, p.17; 12/10/15 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-6.) Counsel for
Mr. Bonilla recommended an aggregate unified sentence of three or four years, with one
year fixed, and the presentence investigator recommended a period of retained
jurisdiction.

(12/10/15 Tr., p.63, Ls.3-5; PSI, p.28.)

The district court abused its

discretion when it imposed two far lengthier sentences and did not retain jurisdiction.
In sentencing Mr. Bonilla, the district court placed great, and undue, emphasis on
Mr. Bonilla’s children. The district court asked Mr. Bonilla when he could first recall his
parents’ drug use, and he replied he was probably four or five years old. (12/10/15
Tr., p.66, Ls.6-11.) The district court said, “I want you to remember that because your
children are 1 and 2 now, and I’ll tell you, I’m not going to place you on probation, and
I’m not going to give you a rider, but I’ll let you know, about the time you finish your fixed
sentence is about that time in your child’s life.” (12/10/15 Tr., p.66, Ls.13-18.) The
district court later said it believed Mr. Bonilla was “naïve” in believing he had kept his
children away from his drug use. (12/10/15 Tr., p.67, Ls.11-12.) The district court said,
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“If you want a better upbringing than you had yourself, if you want your children to be
somewhere else other than in a group home when they’re 9 years old, you’ve got to
have some success in this.”

(12/10/15 Tr., p.67, Ls.12-16.)

Mr. Bonilla certainly

wanted—and wants—to be there for his children. But his children will not benefit from
having their father incarcerated for a minimum of two years. What would benefit
Mr. Bonilla’s children most is to have their father present in their lives, drug-free. The
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Bonilla to a lengthy term of
incarceration, without retaining jurisdiction, that will harm, rather than help, his children,
and is not warranted by the statutory sentencing considerations.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, if this Court affirms the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress, Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentences as it deems appropriate or vacate his sentences and remand this case to the
district court for resentencing.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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